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Abstract—In response to the demand for higher computational
power, the number of computing nodes in high performance
computers (HPC) increases rapidly. Exascale HPC systems are
expected to arrive by 2020. With drastic increase in the number
of HPC system components, it is expected to observe a sudden
increase in the number of failures which, consequently, poses a
threat to the continuous operation of the HPC systems. Detecting
failures as early as possible and, ideally, predicting them, is a
necessary step to avoid interruptions in HPC systems operation.
Anomaly detection is a well-known general purpose approach
for failure detection, in computing systems. The majority of
existing methods are designed for specific architectures, require
adjustments on the computing systems hardware and software,
need excessive information, or pose a threat to users’ and systems’
privacy. This work proposes a node failure detection mechanism
based on a vicinity-based statistical anomaly detection approach
using passively collected and anonymized system log entries.
Application of the proposed approach on system logs collected
over 8 months indicates an anomaly detection precision between
62% to 81%.
I. INTRODUCTION
In response to the demand for higher computational power,
the number of components in high performance computers
(HPC) rapidly increases [1]. It is expected that Exascale HPC
systems become available by 2020 [2]. Besides increasing the
quantity of computing resources, achieving high performance
is also dependent on the optimized utilization of available
resources, as well as on the continuous operation of the HPC
system as a whole. Over the past decades, scientists proposed
various methods and algorithms to adjust the workload on HPC
systems to achieve the highest possible performance. With the
drastic increase in the number of HPC system components, it is
expected to observe a sudden increase in the number of failures
which consequently poses a threat to the continuous operation
of the HPC systems [3]. Therefore, detecting failures as early
as possible and, ideally, predicting them, is a necessary step
to avoid interruptions in continuous HPC systems operation.
A failure in general is an (observed) incorrect behavior with
respect to the expected behavior. Failures can be observed and
analyzed at different granularities, from a single transistor to
an entire HPC system. Nodes are the smallest units in HPC
systems that have a fully functional computational software
stack and can be added or removed from HPC systems with
minimum side-effects on the other computing units. Therefore,
the granularity of failure detection in this work is set at the
node level. Heterogeneity of computing nodes, as well as
the topology of HPC systems, are other effective factors that
influence the overall system performance. In accordance with
node-related effective factors such as physical location, role
in the cluster, computational workload, hardware properties,
and so forth, various categorizations of computing nodes are
possible. Hereafter, the term vicinity is used to refer to nodes
that exhibit similar properties such as the ones mentioned
above. The concept of vicinity defines new dimensions of
node correlation, beyond the natural temporal and spatial
correlations. Subsection II-A provides examples and describes
the vicinity of the nodes in more detail.
An anomaly is an (observed) unexpected behavior with
respect to the expected behavior. In contrast to failures, un-
expected behaviors are not necessarily incorrect behaviors.
Anomaly detection is a well-known general purpose approach
for detecting failures in computing systems [4]. In HPC
systems, system log analysis can be used for anomaly detection
for the purpose of preventing failures [5]–[8]. All HPC systems
on the current TOP500 [9] list are Linux-based. Therefore,
they all generate system log (Syslog) [10] messages by default.
The goal of this work is to detect node failures via analyzing
fully anonymized system logs using a vicinity-based statistical
anomaly detection approach. The use-case of this study is a
production Petascale HPC system, called Taurus1.
In addition to technical data, system log entries contain sen-
sitive data about the system and its users. Therefore, addressing
the data privacy [11] concerns is a fundamental requirement
of any mechanism that detects anomalies on production HPC
systems via system log analysis. The anonymization of system
log entries, prior to performing Syslog analysis while retaining
useful data, addresses the data privacy concerns [12].
In this work, the Taurus nodes are first categorized into
four different vicinities based on similarities they exhibit in
terms of (1) hardware architecture, (2) resource allocation,
(3) physical location, and (4) time of failures. Then, the
anomalies are detected within each vicinity. Subsequently, the
effectiveness of performing anomaly detection in each vicinity
for the purpose of failure detection is compared and discussed.
To assess the usefulness of the proposed method of anomaly
detection on anonymized data, a copy of 8 months of Taurus
system logs was anonymized via the PaRS [13] anonymization
mechanism and the anonymized system logs were used as the
input data.
The main contributions of this work are: (1) proposing a
node failure detection mechanism via a vicinity-based statis-
tical anomaly detection approach that employs a passive data
collection approach, as well as (2) analyzing the effectiveness
of anomaly detection method in various vicinities using the
8 months of Taurus HPC cluster system logs. In addition,
1https://doc.zih.tu-dresden.de/hpc-wiki/bin/view/Compendium/SystemTaurus
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(3) to the best of our knowledge this is the first work on
anomaly detection that is capable of utilizing both original and
anonymized Syslog entries with a high degree of equivalence
between the analysis results.
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. The
node vicinities, data sources, and anonymization method are
introduced in Subsections II-A, II-B, and II-C respectively.
The method to identify node failures employed in this work is
described in Subsection II-D. The proposed anomaly detection
method is described in detail in Subsection II-E. The impact
of anomaly detection in different node vicinities is analyzed
in Section III. The background and current related works are
introduced in Section IV. Finally, the work is concluded and
future work directions are discussed in Section V.
II. PROPOSED ANOMALY DETECTION METHODOLOGY
Taurus is an HPC cluster composed of 2,046 computing
nodes. The computing nodes are organized in 6 islands based
on their hardware properties2. Figure 1 provides a schematic
illustration of the Taurus node topology. Each letter represents
a single computing node. Nodes with identical colors are of
identical hardware (processing unit) architecture.
A. Vicinities
Computing nodes with similar characteristics are consid-
ered to be in the vicinity of each other. Node characteristics
include any physical, spatial, temporal, or logical properties
of the computing nodes. A group of computing nodes located
in the same rack, performing different tasks of the same job,
or sharing a common resource (e.g., file system, power supply
unit), are all examples of nodes in the vicinity of each other.
The concept of vicinity defines new dimensions of node
correlation, beyond the natural temporal and spatial correla-
tions. Each vicinity can be imagined as a new dimension in
which two separated entities (nodes) become correlated. For
example, points A : (1, 10) and B : (4, 6) in a 2D Cartesian
representation are separated by a distance of 4− 1 = 3 on the
X axis and 10−6 = 4 on the Y axis, respectively. Defining the
new dimension Z, according to a common (but so far unseen)
feature of A and B would result in a 3D representation of
A : (1, 10, 5) and B : (4, 6, 5). Here ’5’ denotes that common
feature. In the new 3D representation, even though A and B
are still separated on X and Y , their distance on the dimension
Z will be 5− 5 = 0. In another word, A and B will be in the
vicinity of each other from the Z axis perspective.
In this work, node vicinities are observed from four dif-
ferent perspectives: (1) hardware architecture, (2) resource
allocation, (3) physical location, and (4) time of failure. The
first perspective denotes a node vicinity according to the node’s
physical properties, the second perspective emphasizes the
node’s logical properties, while the third and fourth perspec-
tives denote spatial and temporal properties, respectively. All
other correlations among nodes can be mapped onto these
four proposed vicinities, e.g., nodes connected to a single
switch can be mapped onto the physical location vicinity. In
2Detailed hardware information of Taurus: https://doc.zih.tu-dresden.de/hpc-
wiki/bin/view/Compendium/HardwareTaurus
Table I: Hardware architecture of Taurus computing nodes
Architecture Haswell Sandy Bridge Westmere Broadwell GPU (K20X/k80)
Node count 1456 270 180 32 108
Island 4, 5, 6 1 3 4 2
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Figure 1: Schematic island and node topology of Taurus. Node colors represent
the dominant processing unit type of a node. Thick border lines indicate the
6 islands of Taurus.
Subsections II-A1, II-A2, II-A3, and II-A4 these four vicinities
are explained in more detail, based on the Taurus architecture.
The node vicinities are intended to mitigate the major char-
acteristic differences between nodes. Therefore, in cases that
several parameters influence a certain node’s characteristic, the
most dominant parameter is considered to identify the node’s
vicinity. All nodes in island 2 beside their Sandy bridge or
Haswell CPUs are equipped with graphical processing units
(GPU). Since the majority of jobs submitted to island 2
mainly utilize GPUs rather than CPUs, GPUs are considered
as dominant processing units of these nodes. Therefore, in this
work, island 2 is considered as a homogeneous GPU island,
despite the heterogeneity of its nodes’ CPUs.
It is important to emphasize that in the context of this
work, two nodes in the vicinity of each other are not neces-
sarily physically co-located. In fact, they may even belong to
physically separated partitions of the HPC system.
1) Hardware Architecture Vicinity: Computing nodes on
Taurus may be of 4 different processors architectures: Intel
Haswell, Broadwell, Sandy Bridge, and Westmere. 108 nodes
with Sandy Bridge and Haswell processors are also equipped
with GPUs (NVIDIA Tesla K20X and K80). According to their
hardware architectures, the 2,046 computing nodes on Taurus
can be divided into 5 categories. The node’s dominant proces-
sor architecture and the number of nodes in each architecture
category are shown in Table I. A schematic illustration of the
Taurus topology, including the type of each node’s hardware
architecture is provided in Figure 1. Nodes with identical
colors in Figure 1 are in the vicinity of each other from
the hardware architecture perspective.
2) Resource Allocation Vicinity: Taurus employs
Slurm [14] for job scheduling. The submitted jobs are
allocated resources based on direct requests of the users,
system policies, and the status of available resources. All
nodes that execute tasks of the same job are in the vicinity
of each other from the resource allocation perspective.
In contrast to the static nature of the hardware architecture
vicinity perspective, the resource allocation vicinity is fully
dynamic and may change frequently as the running jobs are
completed and new jobs are submitted to the cluster.
3) Physical Location Vicinity: Various granularities can be
used to express the physical location of a node in Taurus,
e.g., chassis, rack, or island. Since the power, temperature, and
connectivity of all nodes located in a single rack are controlled
together, this work considers racks as the physical location
granularity. Each row of an island shown in Figure 1 represents
one rack of nodes. All nodes located in the same rack are
in the vicinity of each other from the physical location
perspective.
4) Time of Failure Vicinity: Often failure is a consequence
of various node-level events on and of properties of several
nodes. However, a failure in itself is observable on a particular
node at a specific moment. Therefore, the time of failure
is considered as a temporal property of that particular node
even though, several nodes may fail due to the same reason.
From this perspective, all nodes that experience a failure
within the same predefined time interval, fall into the
same vicinity category. In this work, the time of failure
interval considered is 10 minutes. The 10-minute time interval
is chosen according to the results of the previous study on
Taurus failure correlations [8]. That study revealed that the
majority of failures correlated on Taurus occurred within 10
minutes of each other. Therefore, failures that occur across the
entire system within 10 minutes of each other are assumed to
be in the same temporal vicinity. Thus, the nodes on which
such failures occur are in the vicinity of each other from the
time of failure perspective.
B. Data Sources
System logs represent the main data source in this work.
Syslogs of Taurus were collected for a period of one year
from January to December 2017. Syslog daemons on each
node collected the system log entries and forwarded them
to a central log collector. To maintain the neutrality of the
results and to provide a general approach, the pre-configured
Syslog daemons were used without any changes, except for
being configured to forward Syslog entries to the central log
collector.
In addition to Syslog entries, three other data sources were
considered to improve the accuracy of the failure identification
method: outage database, service notifications, and job status
reports. The outage database reports all system outages from
the users’ perspective, the service notifications notify users
regarding future scheduled maintenances and system-wide
outages, and the job status reports indicate the final status of
a job after its execution. Table II provides an overview of the
four data sources used in this work.
There are certain data gaps in the four data sources used in
this work. The gaps are mainly incurred due to the interruption
Table II: Data sources
Data source Data collection Information Granularity
System logs Automatic Software and hardware Component
Outage database Semi-automatic Service availability Entire system
Service notifications Manual Service availability Entire system
Job status reports Automatic Job completion status Node
i1003
i1042
i1069
i1096
i1126
i1153
i1180
i1207
i1234
i1261
i2001
i2012
i2023
i2034
i2048
i2059
i2070
i2081
i2092
i2103
i3001
i3019
i3037
i3055
i3074
i3092
i3110
i3128
i3146
i3164
i4001
i4028
i4055
i4082
i4109
i4136
i4165
i4192
i4219
i4246
Jan Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun Jul Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
i5001
i5063
i5128
i5190
i5254
i5316
i5378
i5440
i5502
i5564
Jan Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun Jul Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
i6001
i6063
i6125
i6187
i6250
i6312
i6374
i6436
i6498
i6560
Completed
Failed
Slurm job status
Successful and Failed jobs reported by Slurm
Date Date
N
od
e 
ID
s
N
od
e 
ID
s
N
od
e 
ID
s
(a) Island 1 (b) Island 2
(c) Island 3 (d) Island 4
(e) Island 5 (f) Island 6
Figure 2: Slurm job status report on all islands of Taurus for the year 2017.
Intervals of unavailability of jobs reports do not necessarily specify node
outages. The red dots indicate jobs reported as ”failed” concurrent to a node
failure.
of the data collection mechanism. The Syslog entries cover
the full period of one year from January to December 2017.
The job status reports generated by Slurm showed in Figure 2
covers the period of 28-02-2017 to 14-11-2017. The service
notifications and the outage database, provide information from
a higher perspective and are available for the whole period of
one year from January to December 2017.
Given these available data, the focus of this work is on
the period of 01-03-2017 to 31-10-2017. The existence of
certain gaps in data sources is reportedly a common challenge
in similar studies [15].
C. Anonymization of System Logs
System log entries contain sensitive data about the system
and its users. Therefore, addressing data privacy concerns is
a fundamental requirement of any mechanism that performs
system log analysis. The anonymization of system log entries,
prior to performing Syslog analysis, addresses the data privacy
concerns.
Table III: Sample syslog entries in their original and anonymized form
# Original Syslog entry Anonymized
1 (siavash) CMD (/usr/bin/check >/dev/null 2>&1) 66dc2742
2 (florina) CMD (/usr/lib32/lm/lm1 1 1) 66dc2742
3 (siavash) CMD (run-parts /etc/cron.hourly) 66dc2742
4 starting 0anacron dd740712
5 Anacron started on 2018-01-30 e5a59462
6 Jobs will be executed sequentially f1e7eac3
7 Normal exit (0 jobs run) eac7924f
8 finished 0anacron a5803a8a
9 (siavash) CMD (/usr/lib32/lm/lm1 1 1) 66dc2742
10 (root) CMD (/usr/lib32/cl/cl2 1 1) 66dc2742
PaRS [13] is an anonymization mechanism that provides
full anonymization through hashing the message part of Syslog
entries. PaRS substitutes all variables and sensitive terms in
each log entry with constant values and maps each substi-
tuted entry to a hash key. Through anonymization, the partial
semantic of log entries required for anomaly detection via
Syslog analysis is preserved. The rightmost column in Table III
contains the anonymized Syslog entries which correspond to
the raw log entries shown in the middle column (prior to
anonymization). As shown in Table III, an identical hash key
is generated for entries with similar raw log semantics.
D. Taurus Node Failures
To assess the proposed method’s functionality, all Taurus
node failures must be known. Due to various technical reasons,
the complete list of all node failures on Taurus for the period
of this work is not available. This step is aimed to provide a
complete list of Taurus node failures as the ground truth for
further analysis and comparisons in Section III.
Node failures in computing systems can be divided into
two main categories according to their root causes: (1) Failures
that occur during the normal operation of the HPC system
caused by internal factors, such as software and hardware
errors or race conditions (i.e., regular failures). (2) Failures
that occur due to external factors, such as power outages and
human errors. Analyzing the impact of the external causes of
node failures requires additional information regarding external
factors that are not available, e.g., detailed information about
the behavior of the HPC system power supply. Therefore, the
focus in this work is on the first group of node failures namely
regular failures, typically caused by internal factors. The next
step to identify such failures is to detect node outages and to
distinguish regular failures from those which may occur as a
result of external factors, such as maintenance, human errors,
and others. The failure detection workflow in Taurus is shown
in Figure 4.
Computing nodes of Taurus generate and send Syslog
entries to a central log collector which stores them for future
analysis. This is a passive log collection mechanism chosen
due to imposing no additional overhead, and to be applicable to
other HPC systems. However, the failure identification process
becomes more challenging in comparison to the use of active
log collection mechanisms. Due to using the passive log col-
lection mechanism, a node outage can be confidently detected
only when a direct indication in the form of a log entry is
generated by the failing node and correctly received and stored
by the central log collector, e.g.,” Kernel panic - not syncing:
Fatal Exception.” However, in many cases, a node outage
leaves no direct indication in system logs. A workaround is to
assume the absence of log entries for more than a certain period
of time as an indication of a potential outage. Nonetheless, this
assumption is not accurate. For various reasons such as CPU
overloading or network congestion, the flow of system log
entries from the computing nodes to the central log collector
may be interrupted or delayed, which could be assumed as an
outage, even though the computing nodes are functional. Also,
in many cases immediately after the occurrence of an outage,
the protection mechanisms recover the node. In both latter
scenarios (temporary interruption in data flow and automatic
node recovery), an active node probing approach may also fail
to correctly detect all node outages.
Analyzing Taurus system logs revealed that during a
healthy boot all nodes leave similar footprints in Syslog entries.
When a node fails to generate the expected footprint at boot
time, it is an indication of a faulty boot process and thus the
node will be either automatically rebooted or it will fail shortly
thereafter. The higher frequency of log generation at boot time
in comparison with the normal operation is another indicator of
a boot event, which can be used to identify even a problematic
boot process.
The proposed node outage detection method in this work
first detects the node boot events. Afterward, Syslog entries are
backtracked until the last Syslog entry before the boot event
is found. The timestamp of the last Syslog entry prior to the
boot event is considered as the point of the outage. All node
outages will be identified using the proposed method. The only
exception is when a node fails and has no further successful
boot process. In such cases, comparing the timestamp of the
last available Syslog entry with the current time (i.e., 31-10-
2017 23:59:59) reveals the missing node outages. Figure 3
illustrates all detected node outages on Taurus over the course
of 2017.
The detected outages are compared against the information
from other available data sources (mentioned in Table II).
When a node outage occurs outside of the scheduled main-
tenance period and no job could be accomplished on that
particular node at the time of the detected outage, the detected
outage represents a regular failure. As Figure 2 illustrates, it is
common that certain jobs on a specific node fail, although other
jobs on the same node are accomplished simultaneously. Also,
when a node outage is recorded in the outages database that
monitors the availability of the HPC system from the users’
perspective, it is considered as a regular failure.
E. Anomaly Detection
The common behavior of most nodes within a node vicinity
is considered as normal behavior in that vicinity. A node’s
behavior is defined as the Syslog Generation frequency of
the node (hereafter SG). The SG parameter is dynamically
calculated based on the number of Syslog entries received from
a computing node during a fixed time window (e.g. 30 minutes)
prior to the current (observation) moment. The SG parameter
of each node is compared against the SG of other nodes in the
same vicinity. Based on these comparisons, the normal value of
the SG parameter of certain nodes at a given moment in time is
calculated. Once the deviation of a node’s SG parameter from
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Figure 3: Node outages detected via Syslog analysis. Unexpected events
(shown in red) indicate the absence of information in system logs which may
be a sign of node crashes. Expected events indicate node outages that are
planned due to maintenance or intentionally caused by the system protection
mechanisms in place.
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Figure 4: Failure detection Workflow via system logs. In case of having both
contradicting results at once, the incident will not be considered as a failure.
the normal behavior exceeds a certain threshold, the node’s
behavior is considered abnormal. The deviation threshold is
dynamically calculated within each vicinity3. To calculate the
deviation threshold, all nodes within a vicinity (i.e. one row
of Figure 5) are partitioned into 2 clusters based on their
SG parameter via a clustering method such as K-Means. The
deviation threshold is the relative density of resulting clusters
which is calculated as the sum of squared distances of samples
to their closest cluster center4.
Figure 5 illustrates the behavior of node 1110 and 8 other
neighboring nodes (physically located next to each other) prior
to a point in time when 11 failures occurred on node 1110
3A sample code written in python to demonstrate the calculation of dynamic
thresholds via k-means is available: ghiasvand.net/u/param
4Also known as within cluster sum.
1106 1107 1108 1109 1110 1111 1112 1113 1114 Norm
10/03/2017 13:55:51 11 11 11 206 214 15 15 15 15 13
10/03/2017 14:07:24 17 16 20 306 1681 21 21 21 21 76
14/03/2017 16:45:56 69 71 67 77 76 59 68 76 55 71
22/03/2017 13:31:13 60 52 28 30 107 21 30 30 30 38
04/05/2017 01:39:16 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
31/07/2017 12:30:49 10 10 10 0 14 10 10 10 10 10
31/07/2017 15:20:17 23 23 23 0 36 23 23 23 23 23
02/08/2017 16:40:15 5 5 7 0 20 5 5 5 5 6
08/08/2017 12:27:44 10 10 10 341 212 11 11 11 11 10
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Figure 5: Detection of failures (shown in orange) of node 1110 via the
proposed failure detection mechanism. Cells colored in light blue indicate
non-responsive nodes.
1106 1107 1108 1109 1110 1111 1112 1113 1114 Norm
04/03/2017 15:07:52 18 17 17 0 19 19 19 17 17 17
08/04/2017 15:43:38 12 11 12 11 12 12 11 11 11 11
19/04/2017 07:30:36 42 41 40 41 41 41 41 41 41 41
01/05/2017 11:02:41 28 37 29 29 17 17 36 34 30 17
22/05/2017 14:29:44 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
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Figure 6: Application of the proposed failure detection mechanism during
normal behavior of node 1110. Detected failures are shown in orange. Cells
colored in light blue indicate non-responsive nodes.
in the year 2017. Figure 6 on the other hand, illustrates the
behavior of the same nodes prior to 11 random points of
time in which node 1110 functioned normally. In Figure 5
and Figure 6, the timestamp at the beginning of each row
represents the observation moment in the year 2017. The value
of each cell represents the SG parameter of the respective node
(column’s header) within a time interval of 30 minutes prior
to the observation moment. Cells with abnormal behavior are
shown in orange. The cell coloring in each row is relative to the
value of other cells in that particular vicinity (row). According
to Figure 5, node 1110 experienced 11 failures in 2017. For 7
out of the 11 failures illustrated in Figure 5, the deviation of
the SG parameter correctly identifies the abnormal behavior of
node 1110.
In the example provided in Figure 5, the SG parameters
were obtained for the nodes physical location vicinity. The
same comparisons were made within other node vicinities. In
Section III the effectiveness of the proposed anomaly detection
method in each node vicinity is discussed.
III. IMPACT OF VICINITIES ON ANOMALY DETECTION
The proposed anomaly detection method was applied to 8
months of Taurus system logs. Regular failures were detected
based on the node vicinities introduced in Subsection II-A.
The proposed method is applicable to hardware architecture,
resource allocation, and physical location vicinities for the
purpose of online anomaly detection. However, the time of
failure vicinity can only be used as an offline approach to
analyze the nodes’ behavior after each failure occurrence.
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Figure 7: Syslog generation patterns of different islands. Each sub-diagram
is vertically divided into two sections. Each section illustrates the Syslog
generation pattern of 100 nodes of the respective island during 24 hours. e.g.,
sub-diagram (e) illustrates the Syslog generation pattern of island 1 (bottom)
versus island 6 (top).
Results of the proposed method’s application on Taurus
system logs were compared against the set of regular fail-
ures detected in Subsection II-D. The following subsections
describe the impact of performing the proposed anomaly
detection method in each vicinity in more detail.
A. Impact of Hardware Architecture Vicinity
Taurus nodes are located in 6 islands. As shown in Figure 1,
island 4 hosts nodes with different processor types, while
islands 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 are homogeneous. Although the
nodes’ hardware architecture influences the job allocation, as
Figure 2 illustrates there is no noticeable difference among
job allocation patterns on various Taurus islands. However, as
shown in Figure 3, with the exception of islands 5 and 6 -
which comprise of identical processor types- the node outages
have different distribution patterns on each island.
Figure 7 illustrates a one-to-one comparison of Syslog
generation patterns in all 6 islands of Taurus. This figure
visualizes the temporal and spatial patterns among more than
46K, 82K, 45K, 968K, 940K, and 1M Syslog entries generated
by islands 1 to 6, respectively. Islands 5 and 6 present an
almost identical pattern, which is also very similar to island 4.
In contrast, the system log generation pattern on each of the
islands 1, 2, and 3 has a completely different pattern.
The comparison shown in Figure 7 indicates that the
processor architecture has a direct impact on node behavior.
Therefore, the behavior of nodes in island 1 (Sandy Bridge)
should not be predicted based on the behavior of nodes in
island 3 (Westmere), while a similar behavior is expected from
nodes in island 5 (Haswell) and island 6 (Haswell).
No additional patterns were detected when conducting
a similar analysis based on the amount of node’s physical
memory. The use of the proposed anomaly detection method
on nodes with different hardware architecture proved to be
virtually impossible. Detecting anomalies within the hardware
architecture vicinity on Taurus also revealed several false
positives.
It is intended to improve the accuracy of the proposed
statistical anomaly detection method by identifying the most
relevant vicinity perspective among the four vicinities consid-
ered in this work. The proposed method detects anomalies
by analyzing fully anonymized system logs. To the best of
our knowledge, there is no similar approach for detecting
anomalies using fully anonymized system logs. Therefore,
a quantitative comparison cannot be conducted. However,
Table IV shows a qualitative comparison of the proposed
method’s accuracy inside and outside of each vicinity.
B. Impact of Resource Allocation Vicinity
Figure 2 illustrates jobs that failed due to node failures,
as reported by Slurm. Several jobs which were allocated on
multiple nodes were terminated due to node failures during
the 8-month period considered in this work. However, except
for one incident in which a misbehaving job was causing the
node failures, no direct correlation between the node failures
and resource allocation was found. Therefore, among a group
of computing nodes executing various tasks of the same job, as
long as the running job is not causing a node failure itself, the
probability of a second node failure occurrence is not higher
than on the rest of the cluster.
It is important to emphasize that the globally shared
resources are not included in this analysis and conclusion. The
abnormal behavior of globally shared resources such as the
distributed file system may cause node failures itself. Globally
shared resources are, however, unique entities in the cluster.
Thus, directly including them in anomaly detection will not
bring any additional benefit. Globally shared resources are, in
fact, indirectly considered in anomaly detection as correlations
between nodes.
The use of the proposed anomaly detection method on
resource allocation vicinity did not improve the accuracy
of anomaly detection. However, the low number of failed
jobs allocated on multiple nodes prevents drawing a robust
conclusion.
C. Impact of Physical Location Vicinity
Computing nodes are located inside HPC systems accord-
ing to their function and architecture. Therefore, the physical
location of the nodes is not an independent factor. The physical
location of each computing node on Taurus can uniquely be
addressed by its island, rack and chassis number. Analyzing
the distribution of failures on Taurus as shown in Figures 2
and 3, reveals a strong correlation among failures in each
rack. Therefore, in comparison with the rest of the cluster,
it is more likely to observe the second failure in a rack that
already experienced a node failure.
Out of the 2,046 computing nodes on Taurus, about 20%
of nodes never reported a node failure, and 60% of computing
nodes experienced 10 or fewer node failures during the time
period considered in this work. The remaining 20% of com-
puting nodes are responsible for more than 70% of all node
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Figure 8: Taurus node failures in the year 2017, nodes are sorted increasingly
by the number of failures. The exponential increase in the number of failures
on certain nodes indicates a higher probability of subsequent failures.
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Figure 9: Jobs reported as ”failed” on Taurus in 2017 at the time of node
failures.
failures. As shown in Figure 8, the probability of a future node
failure is in proportion to the number of previous node failures.
Application of the proposed anomaly detection method
on the physical location vicinity provided the most accurate
results among the three vicinities of hardware architecture,
resource allocation, and physical location. The higher accuracy
and the static nature of physical location vicinity make it a
good candidate for the application of the proposed anomaly
detection method.
D. Impact of Time of Failure Vicinity
The time of failure vicinity includes all computing nodes
which experience a node failure within a predefined time
period (e.g., 10 minutes) regardless of their physical location.
Therefore, it is required to regularly update the set of nodes
in this vicinity and also unlike the others, it can be used
only for offline behavior analysis after node failure. However,
the results of offline behavior analysis can be used in online
anomaly detection.
Figure 9 illustrates job failures on Taurus. Each red circle
represents a failure occurred on a node on a specific date. The
horizontal concentration of red circles indicates several failures
on a node, while the vertical concentration of circles represents
simultaneous failures on several nodes. In several cases, a tem-
poral correlation among node failures is observable. However,
in most cases, the temporal correlation is supported by an even
stronger spatial correlation (horizontal concentration of points
in Figure 3 and Figure 9).
Table IV: Accuracy of the proposed failure detection method in different
vicinities
Anomaly
detection
Hardware
architecture
Resource
allocation
Physical
location
Time of
failure
Inside vicinity Fair Low High Fair (certain failures)
Outside vicinity No Low Low No
Table V: Results of applying the proposed failure detection method on Taurus
Syslogs entries
Data format Precision Recall
Syslog 62% 89%
Anonymized Syslog 62% 89%
Filtered Syslog 87% 83%
Filtered anonymized Syslog 81% 75%
Application of the proposed anomaly detection method on
time of failure vicinity provided different results according to
the cause of failures. When failures were caused by misbe-
having global shared resources, such as the distributed file
system, the results were accurate and reliable. However, for
other causes of failures, such as misuse of local resources or
sudden network interruptions, a high number of false positives
hindered the successful anomaly detection.
E. Results and Discussions
Table IV summarizes the outcome of Subsections III-A,
III-B, III-C, and III-D in which the efficiency of anomaly
detection was studied in various vicinities. According to these
preliminary results, the impact of failure detection via the
proposed method inside resource allocation and time of failure
vicinities of Taurus is negligible and thus, should be avoided.
Failure detection inside the Physical location vicinity, on the
other hand, has a high impact on the accuracy of the final
results. It also became evident that the application of the
proposed method outside the hardware architecture vicinity
of nodes can significantly degrade the accuracy of the failure
detection mechanism.
Therefore, based on the preliminary results shown in
Table IV the proposed method was applied to the physical
location vicinities within each hardware architecture vicinity.
With the exception of one rack in island 4 as shown in
Figure 1, on Taurus this vicinity is practically a single rack
with homogeneous computing nodes.
Table V summarizes the final results of applying the
proposed failure detection mechanism on Taurus system logs.
Using the original Syslog entries as the input data, with
a precision of 62% the majority of failures were detected.
Since the proposed method only considers the frequency of
log entries rather than the content of each log entry, the
similar output could be achieved by using the anonymized
Syslog entries without endangering the users’ privacy. The
PaRS anonymization method, used in this work, preserves the
similarity of Syslog entries such that the frequency of each type
of entries can be precisely calculated. Filtering out frequent
log entries from the input data further improves the precision,
with a 6% penalty on recall. Filtering frequent entries from
anonymized system logs also improves the precision of the
failure detection mechanism, although the recall factor is
reduced to 75%. The difference between the results of filtered
Syslog entries and filtered anonymized Syslog entries lies in
the filtering approach. Since the content of anonymized system
logs cannot be read, frequent log entries are detected based
on their hash key and time-stamp. Therefore, some log entries
have been mistakenly filtered out. Filtering frequent log entries
before data anonymization requires further analysis of original
system logs and may endanger user privacy.
The majority of the undetected anomalies (false negatives)
are related to sudden failures that do not leave large footprints
in system logs (e.g., power outage). Several false negatives
were also caused by calculating the wrong threshold for
the SG parameter (e.g. shortly after major system updates).
Fine tuning the threshold calculator -via comparing similar
vicinities- improves the recall rate by about 4%.
IV. RELATED WORK
Failures in traditional high performance computing systems
were either completely ignored, avoided or at most addressed
in the middleware layer [16]. The advances in the size and
complexity of the HPC systems, demanded more flexible
approaches against failures since they are a norm rather than an
exception [17]. The checkpoint/restart and redundancy became
the de-facto methods to protect HPC systems against node
failures. However, both methods impose performance and
energy consumption penalties. Knowing the point of failure
and adapting the checkpointing period or the redundancy
level accordingly will increase performance and reduce energy
consumption significantly [18]. Despite the existence of failure
protection mechanisms, the ever decreasing mean time be-
tween failures remains a key challenge for Exascale computing
systems [19].
Considering the high number of components in modern
HPC systems and the strong correlations between node failures
[8], [15], several studies investigate behavioral analysis to
predict failures via anomaly detection. Both supervised [20]
and unsupervised [21] approaches were proposed. Addition-
ally, several tools were designed to assist in the detection
of node failure correlations [22], [23]. Many of the proposed
approaches, such as proactive failure detection [24] are limited
to certain components of the system. More general approaches,
such as a framework for detecting anomalous messages [25]
requires access to the full text of the original Syslog entries.
All the above-mentioned works are based on system log
analysis. The huge volume of system logs generated by HPC
systems demands more automated approaches that take advan-
tage of big data analysis [26] and machine learning algorithms.
Algorithms, models and tools such as those proposed by
Anwesha [27], Zhang [28], Gupta [29], and Du [30] are few
examples of using deep learning for predicting failures in HPC
systems via Syslog analysis.
The drawback of all application-dependent approaches is
the overhead incurred to the HPC system. Using high levels of
redundancy and special purpose designed architectures are also
not general solutions for existing and operational HPC systems.
In addition, the available failure prediction methods are either
using models configured for a specific HPC system or require
detailed information about all events occurring on the HPC
system which endangers users’ privacy. A working solution
should be applicable to existing operational HPC systems and
should not incur extensive overhead to the underlying system.
Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, none of the existing
approaches consider users’ privacy protection as a fundamental
principle in their analysis.
The proposed approach in this work employs a statistical
Syslog analysis to detect anomalies in existing and operational
HPC systems. In contrast to other approaches, the proposed
approach protects users’ privacy by design. Since the input data
(system logs) are passively collected, always anonymized, and
no modification of the original HPC system is required, the
proposed approach is applicable to virtually all existing and
operational HPC systems. Furthermore, system logs can be
replaced by any other persistent source of information which
reflects the HPC system status.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Given that failures are becoming an integral part of HPC
systems, employing mechanisms that detect failures as early as
possible significantly reduces the recovery costs and reduces
the interruptions in the normal operation of HPC systems. In
this work, a node failure detection mechanism via anomaly
detection on system logs was proposed, which calculates the
nodes system log generation frequency (the SG parameter)
during a fixed time interval and compares this parameter
against other nodes in the vicinity. The concept of vicinity
defines new dimensions of node correlation, beyond the natural
temporal and spatial correlations. Abnormal behavior and thus
a node failure is detected by reaching a deviation threshold
from the SG parameter of the majority of the nodes. Eight
months of system logs collected from the Taurus HPC cluster
were used as the main data source. The proposed failure
detection mechanism was applied to Taurus system logs in
four different vicinities. According to the results, the most
effective vicinities were identified as physical location and
hardware architecture. Finally, the proposed mechanism was
applied to each rack of computing nodes with similar hardware
architecture within the Taurus HPC cluster. Using each of
the original or fully anonymized system log entries a node
failure detection precision of 62% could be reached. Filtering
out frequent common Syslog entries improved the precision of
node failure detection to 87%. It has been also shown that the
proposed mechanism could detect 75% of node failures with
more than 80% precision via analyzing filtered anonymized
Syslog entries.
For future work, it is planned to dynamically adjust the
interval of the sliding time window which calculates the SG
parameter of each node, according to the feedback received
from the time of failure vicinity. Also, at the moment, the
detection occurs rather close to the time of failure, which could
be improved by better filtering of the input data. Furthermore,
the resource allocation vicinity will be further studied via
analyzing jobs’ information that are executed across multi-
ple nodes. Performing similar analyses on publicly available
system logs, such as those from the Failure Trace Archive
(FTA)5 or the Computer Failure Data Repository (CFDR)6, as
well as other types of monitoring data, such as node power
consumption, are also planned as future work.
5fta.scem.uws.edu.au/index.php?n=Main.DataSets
6www.usenix.org/cfdr
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